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
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
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September 1977

Emergent Nationality Problems in the USSR

Jeremy Azrael

A Project AIR FORCE report
prepared for the
United States Air Force



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→ An analysis of emergent ethnodemographic and ethnopolitical trends in the USSR and a discussion of their economic, military, and political implications for the Soviet regime and for the West. There is a large disparity between the population growth rates of the country's "European" (Slavic and Baltic) nationalities, which are low and have steadily fallen, and the growth rates of its "non-European" (Caucasian and Central Asian) nationalities, which are extremely high. As a consequence, by the end of the century, between 20 and 25 percent of its teenagers and young adults will be "non-Europeans," of whom the vast majority will be Muslim Central Asians. ←
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PREFACE

This report analyzes some emergent ethnodemographic and ethno-political trends in the USSR and examines their economic, military, and political implications for the Soviet regime. In addition, it deals briefly with problems and opportunities that these trends are likely to create for policymakers in the West. The report was prepared under the Project AIR FORCE (formerly Project RAND) study effort entitled "Implications of Soviet and Chinese Military Policy and Strategy for Air Force Planning."

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SUMMARY

The changes that are occurring in the ethnodemographic composition and ethnopolitical orientation of the Soviet population could seriously complicate the lives of future Soviet policymakers. Although these changes of themselves will almost certainly not lead to a breakdown of the Soviet system, they could generate considerable *within-system stress* and hamper the further growth of Soviet power.

The ethnodemographic composition of the USSR is characterized by a large disparity between the growth rates of the country's "European" (Slavic and Baltic) nationalities, which are low and have steadily fallen, and the growth rates of its "non-European" (Caucasian and Central Asian) nationalities, which are extremely high. Because the Europeans form such a large majority of the population, overall Soviet population growth has slowed to slightly over 1.3 percent per annum, while the proportion of "non-Europeans" in the population has risen from 11.5 percent in 1959 to an estimated 17 percent in 1977 and is steadily increasing. That the regime is seriously concerned about this situation is indicated by a variety of official statements and actions. However, current trends cannot possibly be stopped or reversed on short notice, and the spectre of a demographic "yellowing" that haunts many Soviet "Europeans" will become an increasingly salient fact.

By the late 1980s, there will probably not be enough "European" entrants into the industrial workforce to replace scheduled "European" retirees, let alone to staff new plants and enterprises. Even if scheduled retirements are deferred and non-industrial manpower is redeployed, the only sizeable reservoir of labor resources will consist of Central Asians. Short of a very sharp increase in labor productivity, therefore, continued economic growth will depend on the regime's willingness and ability either to shift its industrial center of gravity eastward toward the presently semi-developed republics of Central Asia, or to mobilize the presently non-migratory natives of those republics for work in other regions. Both of these alternatives, however, involve large costs and high risks.

On the one hand, a rapid buildup of Central Asia's industrial capacity would require the diversion of a great deal of scarce capital and equipment both from the already industrialized regions of the country and from underdeveloped regions that are far richer than Central Asia in essential natural resources. In addition, such a buildup would probably have the unintended but familiar effect of drawing scarce manpower away from other regions into Central Asia, where the natives are still predominantly technically unskilled peasants. On the other hand, there is little prospect that these natives can be enrolled as *gastarbeiter* without the introduction of incentives and/or sanctions that could not only disrupt both the local and the all-union economy but could also generate serious national unrest. In consequence, there is a distinct possibility that Soviet economic growth will slow appreciably in the near future and that the regime will come under increasing pressure both to speed the acquisition of labor-saving Western technology and to introduce administrative and management reforms of a sort that, though potentially conducive to increased labor productivity, are costly to implement and fraught with political risk.

The manpower demands of the labor-short all-union economy will make it tempting for the regime to reduce the size of its armed forces. In addition to a potential manpower cutback, moreover, the armed forces will face the prospect of a substantial "yellowing." This is foreshadowed, if not foreordained, by the fact that the proportion of "non-Europeans" in the country's prime-age draft pool will increase from a low of 20 to 25 percent to almost 40 percent between the late 1980s and the end of the century. At a minimum, the regime will almost certainly have to abandon its current practice of assigning only a few atypical Central Asians to high-priority military units, while relegating typical Central Asians to construction, supply, and rear service functions. Despite improved schooling, the vast majority of typical Central Asians will probably still be poorly educated by European standards and have a weak command of spoken Russian. In consequence, there is little prospect that the impending decline in the quantity of Soviet military manpower will be counterbalanced by a significant increase in its quality. On the contrary, the language-related command,

control, and communication problems that have heretofore been largely confined to relatively low priority units could spread to other units, with corresponding adverse effects on the country's military capabilities.

Although these problems could be significantly alleviated by a return to some form of "military federalism," the top leadership is unlikely to endorse any decisive move in this direction because of its fear that national units might provide tacit or open military support for nationalist challenges to central authority. Such challenges have become increasingly frequent and militant in recent years and are likely to become yet more so as a result of the impending "social mobilization" of the Central Asian nationalities, the backlash of the "European" nationalities in general and the Russians in particular to the "expropriation" of "their" resources to speed Central Asia's industrialization, the increasing exposure of the masses to dissident nationalist spokesmen and to the demonstration effects of nationalist protests within the Soviet Union and in the outside world and the growing accessibility of weapons and explosives. Barring a major military defeat or a politically incapacitating succession struggle, there is little immediate prospect that national protest will rise to unmanageable levels. At most, there is likely to be a tenser version of the status quo--i.e., more numerous acts of individual and small group terrorism, more frequent episodes of collective violence, more massive protest demonstrations, more extensive public or semi-public dissent, and the like. Even such "manageable" outcomes, however, would force the regime to introduce or strengthen economically counterproductive and politically demoralizing police controls and could jeopardize its ability to secure economic concessions from the West and diplomatic support from the Third World.

Although the ethnodemographic and ethnopolitical pressures that it faces could lead the Kremlin to impose harsher restrictions at home and to tighten its grip on Eastern Europe, they could also conduce toward greater Soviet willingness to enter into balanced force reduction agreements and, more generally, toward a curtailment of Soviet "globalism" and the adoption of a lower Soviet profile in international

affairs. For these latter possibilities to be realized, however, the West may have to apply--or be ready to apply--some of the leverage that it will inevitably acquire by virtue of the fact that the ethnodemographic and ethnopolitical pressures on the Soviet regime can to at least some extent be alleviated or exacerbated by Western actions.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author has profited from the assistance and constructive criticism of a number of Rand colleagues, including Marie Hoepfner, who helped with the computation, collation, and display of most of the demographic data, and Abraham Becker, Julie DaVanzo, Arnold Horelick, Peter Morrison, and Thomas W. Wolfe, who read and commented on draft versions of this report. Thanks (but *not* responsibility) are herewith extended to all of those named, as well as to a number of academic colleagues who have collaborated with the author on a broader investigation of Soviet nationality policies and practices and have helped to shape and sharpen his interest in and understanding of the entire field.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This report examines some of the policy problems that will confront the Soviet leadership over the next ten to twenty years as a result of the rapidly changing ethnodemographic composition and ethnopolitical orientation of the Soviet population. Unlike some recent commentaries, the report does not contend that these problems foreshadow a breakdown of the Soviet system or even that they are likely to reach crisis proportions.¹ Contrary to the view that still prevails in many quarters, however, it *does* contend that these problems are neither adventitious nor recessive and could significantly influence the future development of the Soviet system.² Since most readers will already be acquainted with the main attributes of the Soviet system, this report does not attempt to place the problems that it addresses in their broader setting, which is largely taken for granted. Nor does it attempt to survey

¹See, for example, the remarks of Professor Richard Pipes in "Reflections of a Nationality Expert," in Carl A. Linden and Dimitri K. Simes (eds.), *Nationalities and Nationalism in the USSR: A Soviet Dilemma*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1977, pp. 9-11, especially p. 10. For a somewhat more qualified statement by Pipes, see his "Reflections on the Nationality Problem in the Soviet Union," in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (eds.), *Ethnicity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1975, pp. 453-465, especially pp. 464-465. Compare also the prediction of President Khadaffi of Libya, in his political treatise *The Third Theory*, that, as a result of "the nationalist movement," "a day will come when it [the Soviet Union] will split." (Al-Qadhaffi, Mu'ammarr, *Fi-al-nazerayah al-thalithah*, Benghazi, 1974, p. 28.) According to then-Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, "the national question...creates a major block to gradual evolution" in the USSR and "could prove itself to be the fatal contradiction of Soviet political evolution." (In *Soviet Politics: From the Future to the Past?* Research Institute on International Change, Columbia University, March 1975, p. 31.)

²For a sophisticated and well-informed defense of the proposition that the Soviet Union has become essentially "denationalized" and that the evidence to the contrary derives from a brief and anomalous flare-up of interethnic tensions in the period 1965 to 1970, see the article "Ethnography in Soviet Russia," by David Zil'berman, an ex-Soviet sociologist, in *Dialectic Anthropology*, No. 1, 1976, pp. 135-153, especially p. 149.

the entire range of policy problems which developments on the "nationality front" will or could engender. Rather it focuses on a few selected topics that should be of particular interest to U.S. policymakers and policy planners and attempts to explore these problems in somewhat more detail than one ordinarily finds in either the scholarly or the analytical literature.

II. ETHNODEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

The most elemental of the ethnodemographic problems confronting the regime is the large and persistent disparity in the growth rates of the country's "European" (Slavic and Baltic) nationalities on the one hand and its "non-European" (Caucasian and Central Asian) nationalities on the other.¹ As can be seen in Fig. 1, of the major "European"




Fig. 1 - Population growth rates among major "European" and "non-European" nationalities

¹The reader will, of course, recognize that the categories "European" and "non-European" are synthetic and that each of them includes nationalities that differ from one another in important respects. In the case of the "non-Europeans," the crucial internal distinction is

nationalities, which constitute about four-fifths of the country's total population and therefore dominate its overall demographic performance, only the Moldavians have increased by more than 1.2 percent per annum in recent years and some of them have scarcely increased at all.¹ Of the major "non-European" nationalities, on the other hand, only the Georgians and Tartars have fallen below a 2 percent increase per annum and the Central Asian nationalities have achieved annual increases of close to 4 percent. As a result, "non-Europeans" have increased their share in the country's total population from 11.5 percent in 1959 to a conservatively estimated 17 percent in 1977.²

This disparity (the size and persistence of which the regime had apparently underestimated prior to the 1970 census) has become a source of mounting official concern. There is little doubt, for example, that it was instrumental in the regime's decision to create a special high-level Scientific Council on Nationality Problems under the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences.³ In addition, it was almost certainly a factor

probably between Christians (Georgians and Armenians) and Muslims (Azeri, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Tadzhiks, Kirgiz, and Kazakhs). Except for the Tadzhiks, all of the Muslim nationalities speak mutually comprehensible languages and share a common Turkic background that may be more important to them than their Soviet-sponsored national identities. A striking bit of evidence to this effect is the recent statement by the well-known Kirgiz novelist Chingiz Aitmatov that recent literary output in Central Asia filled him with "Turkic national pride." (As quoted in N. Khudaiberganov, "Vdokhnovennaia Ispoved'," *Pravda Vostoka*, December 10, 1976, p. 3.) That such a statement could be presently made about "Slavic" or "Baltic" national pride seems doubtful. (On the mutual comprehensibility of Soviet Turkic languages, cf. G. K. Dulling's review of a major Soviet study of Turkic languages in *Central Asian Review*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1967, p. 160.)

¹See Appendix for fuller detail.

²S. I. Bruk and M. N. Guboglo, "Development and Interaction of Ethnodemographic and Ethnolinguistic Processes in Soviet Society," *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 4, July/August 1974, pp. 26-45, in *Translations on USSR Political and Sociological Affairs*, No. 556, JPRS 62984, September 17, 1974, pp. 90-123, especially p. 93.

³This Council was created in late 1969 or early 1970 but was apparently moribund until 1974-75, when it went into high-gear operation. For one, among a number, of recent accounts of its work, see the article by the leading Soviet demographer M. N. Guboglo, "V Sektsii obshchestvennykh nauk Prezidiuma AN SSSR - v Nauchnom sovete po natsional'nykh problemam," *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 4, 1976, pp. 148-150.

in Brezhnev's recent call for the formulation of an official demographic policy that would take account of "a number of population problems which have lately become exacerbated."¹ For the immediate future, however, there is little that the regime can do to stimulate the growth rate among "European" nationalities, and no conceivable combination of pro- and anti-natalist policies can avoid a lengthy continuation of the overall trends displayed in Table 1. In consequence, by the end of the century, between 20 and 25 percent of the country's total population and almost 40 percent of its teenagers and young adults will be "non-Europeans," of whom the vast majority will be Central Asians.²

That this prospect has aroused deep-seated psychological and political anxieties among members of the ruling elite is indicated, among other things, by the epithet "yellowing" (*ozheltenie*) that is applied to it in the private conversations of many Soviet officials.³ These anxieties in turn are strongly reinforced by the "jokes," which have gained currency in certain Central Asian circles, about the impending restoration of the Tartar Yoke, the forthcoming confirmation of the proposition that "when you scratch a Russian you find a Tartar," and the fate that will befall the Russians when the Chinese "liberate"

¹Translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 28, No. 8, March 24, 1976, p. 27. Even prior to Brezhnev's statement, the legal implications of possible official demographic policy were discussed at a "roundtable" convened by the editors of the journal *Soviet State and Law* and attended not only by jurists but by representatives of the Central Statistical Administration and the Lenin Military-Political Academy. See "Legal Aspects of Demographic Policy," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 1, January 1975, pp. 28-25, in *Translations on USSR Political and Sociological Affairs*, No. 621, JPRS 64573, April 18, 1975, pp. 1-14, especially p. 5.

²See Appendix. The lowest U.S. Government projections, which are based on assumptions that almost certainly understate probabilities on the Muslim side and probably overstate them on the European side, envision a 21.3 percent Muslim component (65 million) in a 307 million population. (Compare J. F. Besemer, "Population Politics in the U.S.S.R.," *Soviet Union/Union Sovietique*, No. 2, part 1, 1975, p. 69, who, after citing these figures, concludes that they "are so cautious [as regards Muslim growth rates] as to be almost foolhardy.")

³As reported by numerous Soviet emigres.

Table 1

THE CHANGING COMPOSITION OF THE USSR POPULATION, 1959-1970

Nationality	Percentage of Total Population		Percentage Point Change
	1959	1970	
Major "European"	79.6	77.2	-2.4
Russian	54.6	53.4	-1.2
Ukrainian	17.8	16.9	-0.9
Belorussian	3.8	3.7	-0.1
Moldavian	1.1	1.1	0.0
Latvian	0.7	0.6	-0.1
Lithuanian	1.1	1.1	0.0
Estonian	0.4	0.4	0.0
Major "Non-European"	12.6	15.2	+2.6
Uzbek	2.9	3.8	+0.9
Tartar	2.4	2.4	0.0
Kazakh	1.7	2.2	+0.5
Azeri	1.4	1.8	+0.4
Armenian	1.3	1.5	+0.2
Georgian	1.3	1.3	0.0
Tadzhik	0.7	0.9	+0.2
Turkmen	0.5	0.6	+0.1
Kirgiz	0.5	0.6	+0.1
Others	7.8	7.6	-0.2
Selected National Groups			
Slavs ^a	76.3	74.0	-2.3
Non-Slavic "Europeans" ^b	3.3	3.2	-0.1
"Non-European" Christians ^c	2.6	2.8	+0.2
"Non-European" Muslims ^d	10.0	12.4	+2.4
All other	7.8	7.6	-0.2

^aSlavs are defined as the total of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian populations.

^bNon-Slavic "Europeans" are defined as the total of the Moldavian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian populations.

^c"Non-European" Christians are defined as the total of the Georgian and Armenian populations.

^d"Non-European" Muslims are defined as the total of the Uzbek, Tartar, Kazakh, Azeri, Tadzhik, Turkmen, and Kirgiz populations.

Turkestan.¹ Nonetheless, the current ruling elite itself is not discernibly racist in its outlook or composition, and it is doubtful that it feels immediately threatened by an erosion of "white supremacy" or the emergence of a Chinese "fifth column." The fact that it has chosen to treble the number of Turkic representatives on the Politburo (from one to three, with the addition of the Azeri, G. A. Aliev, and the Kazakh or Uighur, D. A. Kunaev, to the Uzbek incumbent, Sh. R. Rashidov) on the eve of a potential succession crisis suggests a relative indifference on the first count, and there is no evidence to suggest that the Central Asians, who are, of course, not yellow but brown, have any real (as against rhetorical) sympathy for the Chinese. Although Chinese propaganda against the domination of Central Asia by "new Tsars" undoubtedly strikes responsive chords, its pro-Chinese content is filtered through an almost primordial Sino-phobia and a widespread awareness (cultivated by the Soviet regime) of the unhappy fate of the Turkic minorities in the People's Republic of China.²

¹As reported by numerous Soviet emigres and Western visitors to the USSR. Cf. also Igor Shafarevich, "Separation or Reconciliation," in Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Michael Agursky, et al., *From Under the Rubble*, Bantam Books, New York, 1976, p. 87, where the author affirms that "In our Central Asian cities I and many others have often heard the cry, 'Just wait til the Chinese come, they'll show you what's what!'"

²For representative Chinese attacks on Soviet nationality policy, see Hung Chuan-yu, "The New Tsars--Common Enemy of the People of All Nationalities in the Soviet Union," *The Peking Review*, No. 27, July 4, 1969, pp. 25-27, and an unsigned article, "Soviet Social-Imperialism Pursues a Policy of National Oppression," *The Peking Review*, No. 22, May 28, 1976, pp. 19-23. Although these and other Chinese statements deal with the "plight" of all non-Russian nationalities, the focus is on the nationalities of Central Asia and on the Ukrainians, who, of course, constitute a significant proportion of the "European" population in Kirgizia and Kazakhstan. For a typical Soviet commentary on China's maltreatment of its Turkic minorities, see V. A. Bogoslovskii, A. M. Kuz'mina, et al., *Velikoderzhavnaia politika maoistov v natsional'nykh raionakh KNR*, Isdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, Moscow, 1975. See also the speech of the Kazakh party first secretary D. A. Kunaev to the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 28, No. 9, March 31, 1976, p. 42; the speech of Kirgiz party first secretary T. U. Usubaliyev to the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 38, No. 11, April 14, 1976, pp. 15-16; and the review of a new Uighur language book

At a minimum, the Kremlin's concern on both these counts is almost certainly less urgent than its concern over the implications of the "yellowing" process for the national economy. In this connection, moreover, what is most troubling is not the shift in the ethnic balance per se but the low "European" (and hence, all-union) growth rates and the fact that the Central Asian nationalities have remained outside the mainstream of the country's economic development and contain a heavy preponderance of undereducated peasants with a weak-to-non-existent knowledge of Russian and a tenacious aversion to interregional or even intraregional migration.¹

by M. K. Khamraev in *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, August 23, 1973, p. 3, which is synopsized in *ABSEES*, January 1974, p. 31. For a description of a Soviet newspaper published for the tens of thousands of Turkic refugees from China, see Christopher S. Wren, "Kazakhstan Beckons Refugees from China," *The New York Times*, April 24, 1976, p. 8. Cf. also Rasma Silde-Karklins, "The Uighurs Between China and the USSR," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Vol. 17, Nos. 2 and 3, 1975, pp. 341-365.

¹ On the extremely low rates of interregional mobility among Central Asians, see V. N. Korovaeva, "Population Migration in the USSR," in G. M. Maksimov (ed.), *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1970 goda*, "Statistika," Moscow, 1976, especially p. 259. The proportion of Central Asian natives who *claim* fluency in Russian is under 20 percent among all nationalities except the Kazakhs, where it is almost 42 percent. See *Sovetskaia Pedagogika*, No. 11, November 1971, p. 65.

III. ECONOMIC DILEMMAS

What the "shortfall" in the country's "European" population means for the economy is that the latter will no longer be able to provide large-scale reinforcements for the industrial workforce. By the late 1980s, the number of "Europeans" reaching working age will actually decline from the present average of about 4 million per annum to only slightly over 2 million per annum, and the regime will be extremely hard pressed to find enough "European" workers to replace those whose retirement (even if extended beyond the current norms of 60 for men and 55 for women) can no longer be delayed.¹ What makes this prospect particularly unsettling, in turn, is the fact that the vast bulk of the increase in industrial output that has occurred in the postwar Soviet Union is attributable to increases in the "European" workforce rather than to increases in per capita labor productivity, which has grown only modestly despite the regime's frantic efforts to raise it.² Even if it manages to replenish its "European" workforce, e.g., by reducing draft terms and/or draft quotas, curtailing full-time secondary education, accelerating the already rapid flight of young "Europeans" from the countryside, etc., the only way it can hope to staff the many new enterprises on which it has staked so much of its prestige and credibility is *either* to locate the bulk of them in Central Asia *or* to

¹Derived from Murray Feshbach and Stephen Repaway, "Soviet Population and Manpower Trends and Policies," in Congress of the United States, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., October 1976, p. 150, Table 16.

²Cf. TsSU SSSR, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1974 godu*, "Statistika," Moscow, 1975, p. 85. According to this official Soviet source, the annual percentage growth of labor productivity in Soviet industry rose from 3.7 in 1964 to 6.3 in 1974. 1974 was a peak year, however, and the annual growth rate figures during the intervening decade were substantially lower. In the 1976 to 1980 Five-Year Plan, the planned average annual growth in industrial labor productivity is 5.7 percent. (See *Izvestiia*, March 7, 1969, p. 5.)

mobilize large numbers of Central Asians for work in other regions.¹ Unfortunately for the regime, however, these are policies which could exact a very heavy price.

Whatever its ultimate benefits, a rapid buildup of Central Asia's industrial capacity would obviously require the diversion of a great deal of scarce capital and equipment both from the already industrialized regions of the country and from underdeveloped regions such as Siberia and the Far North which are far richer than Central Asia in essential (and hard-currency convertible) natural resources. In addition to capital and equipment, moreover, such a buildup could easily have the ironic but historically familiar effect of drawing scarce manpower away from other regions into Central Asia. Despite rising educational levels and urbanization rates, the number of native engineers, technicians, and skilled workers is still extremely limited, and local plant and factory directors have good reason to favor the long-distance recruitment of experienced "European" workers over the employment of ready-to-hand but inexperienced Central Asians, who are not only perceived as undependable but are actually far more likely to miss work and change jobs than their "European" counterparts.² Finally, resources

¹It is also possible, of course, that the Soviet Union could recruit large numbers of foreign workers, thereby emulating not only the labor-deficit countries of Western Europe but also some of its Eastern European neighbors. (Cf. Malcolm W. Browne, "Czechoslovakia Is Importing Vietnamese Workers," *The New York Times*, April 25, 1976, p. 10.) That such a policy is thinkable for the Soviet Union itself is indicated by the extensive importation of Chinese workers during the mid-1950s and by the current employment of some East European and Scandinavian workers on special projects. Nevertheless, a systematic mass recruitment policy would be almost impossible to sustain without drastically changing current economic and political premises and practices.

²The "deficit" of Central Asian engineers and technicians is indicated by the fact that Kazakhs make up only one-sixth of the specialists in their republic's non-ferrous metallurgy, 13 percent in light industry, and only 10 to 24 percent of the students in technical institutes. (See *Narodnoe khoziaistvo Kazakhstana*, No. 10, 1971, pp. 76-80, translated in *ABSEES*, April 1972, p. 12.) In Tadzhikistan, Tadzhiks constituted under one-third of all specialists with secondary education in 1966. (See L. M. Drobizheva, "O sblizhenii urovnei kul'turnogo razvitiia soiuznykh respublik," *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 3, 1969, pp. 61-79.) On the preferences of local factory directors and the reasons

(including human resources) that are transferred to Central Asia (or are retained there when they could be productively relocated) and that do not directly contribute to Soviet area-defense capabilities could be exposed to Chinese weapons when they might otherwise be largely out of range. In contrast to the situation that may have existed in the 1950s or 1960s, moreover, it can no longer be assumed that the mere fact of their location in Central Asia will make strategic objectives significantly less accessible or less vulnerable to U.S. forces. In consequence, those who advocate the rapid industrialization of the one region of the country with a large natural surplus of otherwise scarce labor are likely to encounter strong resistance from military planners, as well as from those party and managerial cadres and foreign-trade officials who are eager to increase Soviet exports and prevent a sharp deterioration in the country's balance of hard-currency payments.¹ As these advocates will undoubtedly point out, however, it may be no less difficult and risky to move the mountain to Muhammed than to attempt the process in reverse.

The chances that large numbers of Central Asians will spontaneously migrate into the labor deficit regions of the country are virtually nil. In the absence of an accelerated industrialization of their own region, to be sure, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of natives will be unable to find full-time employment in the public sector (industrial or agricultural) of the local economy.² In addition, thanks to the

for them, see V. Perevedentsev, "Shagni za okolitsu," *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, January 28, 1976, p. 2; and L. Chizhova, "Regional'nye aspekty izpol'zovaniia trudovykh resursov," in D. Valenti (ed.), *Naselenie Ekonomika*, Moscow, 1973, p. 25, where the author reports that, "practice has shown that some of them [i.e., Central Asians] still adapt badly to industrial labor."

¹The military will undoubtedly continue to favor a transportation buildup in Central Asia to facilitate its logistical operations on the Sino-Soviet "front."

²Agricultural underemployment, as measured by the average number of "labor days" worked by individual collective farmers, is already high in parts of Central Asia and can be expected to grow rapidly as a result of on-going and accelerating mechanization. Cf., for example, V. Litvinov, in *Pravda Vostoka*, November 3, 1974, p. 2, summarized in *ABSEES*, July 1974, p. 55.

tenacity of early marriage and prolific child-bearing practices, many of those concerned will undoubtedly have an inordinately large number of dependents to support. As is the case today, however, the very existence of large families will serve as a constraint on migration to cities in general and to overcrowded "European" cities in particular, and these constraints will be further reinforced by the entire nexus of tradition of which early marriage and high fertility are a part.¹ In the absence of strong counteractions by the regime, moreover, many natives who cannot find jobs in the public sector will still be able not only to survive but to fatten on the proceeds they derive from the individual or familial cottage industries and private household plots that already account for a sizeable share of Central Asian personal income.²

These earnings could undoubtedly be curtailed if the regime were willing to pursue the necessary restrictive policies. Such policies, however, would not only be intrinsically difficult and costly to enforce but potentially dangerous. At a minimum, they would create serious local shortages of at least temporarily irreplaceable foodstuffs,

¹It is worth noting that the average size of rural Uzbek families has grown from 4.8 to 5.8 persons between 1959 and 1970 and that the "ideal" family envisioned by younger Central Asian women is *larger* than the current average Central Asian family. See, inter alia, E. K. Vasil'ieva, *Sem'ia i ee funktsii*, "Statistika," Moscow, 1975, p. 42; and T. N. Roganova, "Number and Composition of Families in the USSR," in G. M. Maksimov (ed.), *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1970 goda, sbornik stat'ei*, "Statistika," Moscow, 1976, pp. 260-275; Izaslaw Frenkel, "Attitudes Toward Family Size in Some Eastern European Countries," *Population Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 1976, p. 56.

²It should be noted that the earned income of Central Asian collective farm families as of 1970 was significantly higher than that of their European counterparts and that the Central Asian cost of living index is lower than that in central Russia. Cf. Gertrude Schroeder, "Soviet Wage and Income Policies in Regional Perspectives," *ACES Bulletin*, Fall 1974, pp. 3-19, and *Ekonomicheskie Nauki*, No. 1, January 1972, p. 52. Cf. also O. Latifi, "Problems of the Rational Utilization of Labor Resources in Tadzhikistan," *Pravda*, June 1, 1975, p. 2, translated in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 27, No. 12, June 25, 1975, p. 1: "If we place a house and a personal plot of ground on one side...and a city apartment on the other...there is no doubt that for the time being the scales will tip toward the first alternative--out of economic advisability and from the standpoint of social psychology." (*Italics added.*)

consumer goods, and personal services. In addition, they might well lead to a slowdown in centrally planned cotton and silk production by the disgruntled native collective farmers who would constitute their principal victims. Furthermore, they could touch off violent protests and terrorist outbursts similar to those that accompanied a recent official crackdown on private entrepreneurship in Georgia.¹ Even if these policies accomplished their immediate purpose, moreover, both the time-tested welfare practices of the still prevalent extended family system and the legally mandatory income-sharing procedures of the collective farms system would significantly reduce their efficacy as spurs to out-migration.²

A search for other, potentially more effective policies that the regime might use to increase the supply of Central Asian *gastarbeiter* yields two basic alternatives: administrative mobilization and economic stimulation. In administrative mobilization, the already existing requirement that graduates of institutions of higher and specialized secondary education work for two to three years at state-assigned jobs could be focused to generate a steady westward flow of younger Central Asian cadres. In addition, the regime could make more extensive use of the already common practice of conscripting militarily "superfluous" or "marginal" Central Asians into the armed forces and posting them to units that perform essentially civilian economic tasks.³ Going further

¹See below, p. 23. According to informed reports, a great deal of the recent unrest in Georgia stems from the regime's pressure on the republic's flourishing "second economy" rather than from directly political sources. See *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 2, No. 12, June 7, 1973, p. 3.

²Although collective farms can legally expel members, superfluity or redundancy is not an authorized ground for doing so.

³Representative Les Aspin has recently calculated that the Soviet armed forces include some 250,000 men who are kept in uniform to do civilian construction work. The Defense Intelligence Agency has allegedly confirmed the basic accuracy of this figure. See John W. Finney, "U.S. Statistics on Soviet Question Extent of Threat," *The New York Times*, April 24, 1976. Representative Aspin also contends that 75,000 troops are permanently assigned to "military farms," a claim that the DIA denies, while acknowledging that large numbers of Soviet soldiers are assigned to farm details on an intermittent basis. Soviet refugees uniformly report that construction units contain a highly disproportionate number of Central Asians.

in the same direction, it could reintroduce a compulsory labor draft of the sort that existed under Stalin, with the sole difference that Central Asian draftees could no longer expect job assignments in their home regions. This last measure would almost certainly have to be accompanied by the reimposition of a large number of highly counterproductive Stalinist controls, however, and even the more moderate variants seem likely to entail political and social costs that would be hard to "recapture" from the output of transient and disgruntled Central Asian workers who accurately viewed themselves as victims of a system of involuntary and discriminatory servitude.

The problems associated with reliance on "Eurocentric" relocation bonuses or pay incentives to attract Central Asian *gastarbeiter* are substantially different from those just mentioned but are in no way less problematical. At the very least, such incentives would be extremely difficult to design and administer and would powerfully reinforce the already strong inflationary pressures within the all-union economy. In addition, it is likely that the native respondents would include a disproportionate number of skilled workers and technical cadres whose contribution to the all-union economy would be equally great or greater on their own home ground and whose enticement away from home would be particularly strongly resented by local party and governmental leaders with an interest in the economic performance and progress of the Central Asian region. Finally, a "Eurocentric" wage or bonus policy could easily precipitate a mass exodus of Central Asia's "European" settlers, whose departure would not only leave key sectors of the regional economy (including the agricultural economy) at least temporarily crippled but would deprive the regime of some of its most reliable agents of central control.¹ Over the long run, the

¹In this connection it is worth noting that "European" outmigration from the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, and Kirgizia has been increasing in recent years (see S. I. Bruk and M. N. Guboglo, op. cit., p. 106) and that the regime has recently raised wages in Central Asia in a clear effort to stem the tide. (Cf. *Izvestiia*, December 28, 1976, p. 1.) One source of this outmigration has been the repatriation (to the Federal Republic) of Volga German collective farmers in Kazakhstan. The number of German repatriates has recently reached 10,000 per annum

regime may lose most of these agents anyway, since the combined demands of Central Asian workers for local jobs and of "European" employers for "European" employees will generate strong pressure for their "repatriation." Even if the regime had no reason to resist this pressure, it would undoubtedly prefer to accommodate it incrementally to prevent repatriation from becoming an unregulated and headlong process.

The prospect of choosing among such unpalatable alternatives would give any leader pause, and it would not be surprising if Brezhnev continued to substitute further study for decisive action. Moreover, it is not unlikely that his successors will also try to "muddle through." Over the longer run, however, the only way in which they can reasonably hope to maintain anything like current growth rates without recourse to measures of the kind discussed above is to secure substantial technology transfers from the West and to implement administrative and managerial reforms that would curb their own day-to-day power and weaken the overall framework of central control. Given the resistance that these prospective outcomes are certain to engender and the difficulties in acquiring and using Western technology, the chances for a successful nullification of the ethnodemographic constraints on the Soviet economy of the 1980s and 1990s seem rather dim. In consequence, it would not be surprising if industrial growth rates declined substantially and if the regime found it increasingly difficult to satisfy both its own appetite for international power and the rising economic expectations of its citizens.

and is likely to remain at this level for some time to come. (J. A. Newth, "The 1970 Soviet Census," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2, October 1972, p. 204.)

IV. MILITARY CONSEQUENCES

Unless there is a rise in international tensions or wider reliance on military conscription as a form of de facto labor draft, the size of the Soviet armed forces is likely to decrease in the next decade or so (they are now estimated to number 4 to 5 million men).¹ Even if the recent reduction in draft terms from 3 to 2 years were rescinded, it would be exceedingly difficult and costly to secure the requisite number of conscripts (currently estimated to number about 1.5 to 1.6 million per year) from a country in which the entire cohort of 18 year old males will be only slightly over 2 million (as against 2.6 million today) and in which, because of the age structure of the general population and the virtually complete (except in Central Asia) "emancipation" of women, there cannot possibly be an increase in the size of the overall civilian workforce except at the military's expense.² While facing a prospective cutback, moreover, the armed forces seem almost certain to undergo a very extensive "yellowing." This outcome is foreshadowed if not fore-ordained by the fact that the proportion of "non-Europeans" among prime draft-age males will rise from a low of 20 to 25 percent in the late 1980s to almost 40 percent by the turn of the century. Indeed, if the

¹Some informed Western analysts estimate Soviet military manpower to be only slightly over 4 million whereas others consider 5 million a likely figure. 4.5 million is the low estimate of General Daniel Graham, then head of the DIA, for 1975. See Congress of the United States, Joint Economic Committee, *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China--1975*, 94th Congress, 1st Session, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1975, pp. 73 and 121.

²Cf. Feshbach and Repaway, op. cit., p. 147, for current conscription estimates, and p. 150, Table 16, for supply of 18 year old males in the 1980s and 1990s. This supply, which is currently over 2.6 million, will fall to 2.01 million during the next decade, and will not begin to rise until 1989, at which point it will rise only slowly and remain below current levels throughout the 1990s. See also, and more generally, two important recent articles by Z. Perevedentsev, "Each of Us and All of Us," *Literaturnaiia Gazeta*, No. 33, August 13, 1975, p. 12, and "The Family: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," *Nash Sovremennik*, No. 6, June 1975, pp. 118-131, both in *Translations on USSR Political and Sociological Affairs*, No. 682, JPRS 65850, October 6, 1975, and No. 645, JPRS 65142, July 3, 1975, respectively.

regime were to follow the dictates of economic rationality alone, the military would become an almost entirely "non-European" institution. In this way, it would be possible not only to avoid the inordinately high civilian opportunity costs of "European" soldiers but also to realize disproportionately high civilian returns on its investments in in-service training programs. Although these programs are often redundant for European trainees, they frequently provide Central Asians with new and readily transferable skills, as well as with a career orientation that could make them somewhat less averse to post-service out-migration. For reasons that by now are already familiar, however, an economically rational conscription policy would significantly exacerbate the already serious military and military-political problems that the natural "yellowing" of the armed forces is sure to pose.

Even if the regime were to flout economic logic and overconscript "Europeans," it would have to abandon what seems, by nearly all refugee accounts, to be its current practice of assigning only a few atypical Central Asians to high-priority military units, including not only units of the strategic rocket forces (SRF) and antiaircraft defense (PVO) but of the air force, the armored corps, the artillery, and even the front-line motorized infantry. Although these units could be kept preponderantly "European," their ranks would still have to be filled with typical Central Asians, who are now assigned mostly to construction, supply, and rear service functions. By the late 1980s and 1990s, it is true, typical Central Asian conscripts will probably be somewhat better educated than their contemporary counterparts, who average less than 10 years of formal schooling.¹ Barring a massive educational breakthrough, however, the vast majority of them will almost certainly still be

¹ Although 10 years of education is compulsory in the Soviet Union and the numbers of rural residents who have completed the tenth grade are higher in Central Asia than in the USSR as a whole, Soviet sources leave no doubt that the quality of rural education is *far* lower than its urban counterpart, and the *vast* majority of Central Asians live in rural areas, whereas most "Europeans" are city-dwellers. Furthermore, there is some reason to believe that official data on Soviet educational attainments in general and Central Asian educational attainments in particular are substantially inflated. (Cf. Jeremy Azrael, "Bringing Up the Soviet Man: Dilemmas and Progress," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 17, No. 3, May/June 1968, pp. 23-31.)

graduates of second- and third-rate rural schools, which will continue to offer rudimentary versions of the military training courses that are now becoming standard features of the senior high school curriculum.¹ In consequence, there is little prospect that any impending decline in the quantity of Soviet military manpower could be counterbalanced by a significant increase in its quality, let alone by an increase that would keep pace with the accelerating "scientific-technological revolution in military affairs."

The difficulties created by the low educational attainments and technical skills of typical Central Asian conscripts will be exacerbated and compounded by their rudimentary command of Russian, which is the only authorized medium of communication within the armed forces and will almost certainly remain the only language spoken by the majority of senior officers.² If there is a significant increase in the percentage of Central Asians who are urbanized, the proportion of Central Asians who speak Russian with some fluency may rise above the current 16 percent.³ However, there is little prospect that it will rise sharply, and present trends suggest that it may actually decline as the proportion of "Europeans" within Central Asia becomes progressively smaller.⁴

¹On the introduction and spread of military training programs in the schools, see, inter alia, H. Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier*, Crane, Russak, & Co., New York, 1975, pp. 47-67.

²Cf. Goldhamer, op. cit., pp. 188-189.

³On the other hand, the very fact that the cities in question will be undergoing substantial "indigenization" may well reduce their role as centers of Russianization.

⁴Thus, according to a verbal communication from Murray Feshbach, the results of the 1970 census suggest a slight decline in the proportion of younger Central Asians who claim fluency in Russian. Compare also *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 287/76, June 2, 1976, p. 1, for the report of a Soviet demographic conference (described in *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 8, 1975, pp. 194-152) at which one speaker contended that "the number of people of non-Russian nationality who do not speak Russian is increasing." Also, S. I. Bruk and M. N. Guboglo, "Bilingualism and the Drawing Together of Nations in the U.S.S.R. (from 1970 Census Data)," *Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, No. 4, July/August 1975, pp. 18-32, in *Translations on USSR Political and Sociological Affairs*, No. 693, JPRS 66078, November 5, 1975, pp. 10-29, especially p. 26, for the lower percentage of Russian-speaking bilinguals among 11 to 19 year old Georgians, Azeris, Armenians, Lithuanians, and Estonians than

In any event, the language-related command, control, and communication problems that have heretofore been largely confined to relatively low-priority units are likely to become prevalent in other units as well, with corresponding degrading effects on the country's military capabilities.¹ Judging by what has reportedly occurred in a variety of enterprises and offices in Central Asia, moreover, there is good reason to believe that units in which Central Asian natives become a *substantial* minority will be particularly prone to demoralizing ethnic tensions and open ethnic conflicts.²

among 30 to 49 year olds in these national groups. For a report on a recent official meeting on the problems of teaching Russian to non-Russians, see *Narodnoe Obrazovanie*, No. 3, March 1974, pp. 7-10, in *Translations on USSR Political and Sociological Affairs*, No. 517, JPRS 61706, April 9, 1974, pp. 37-47. According to this report, there is a serious shortage of Russian language teachers in the Central Asian and Caucasus republics "as a result [of which] the question about teaching the Russian language in the elementary grades of many schools, particularly the rural schools, has become a very acute one" (p. 39). Cf. also O. Chelpanov and S. Matevosyan, "Time for Examinations, and Still...", *Uchitel'skaia Gazeta*, June 28, 1973, p. 3, in *Translations on USSR Political and Sociological Affairs*, No. 457, JPRS 60524, November 1973, pp. 23-28, especially pp. 23-24, where it is reported that in an Armenian senior high school in Erevan, "senior grade pupils cannot answer in Russian the most simple questions..." and that the best high school graduates in rural Armenian high schools "do not even satisfy the requirements [in Russian] stipulated in the elementary program," and the recent article by Uzbek SSR Minister of Education S. Shermukhamedov, who reports that "The Russian language was not taught at all in some schools and in other schools was only partially taught in individual classes of the schools because of the lack of Russian language teachers. Thus, the subject was not taught in 191 schools during the 1971-72 school year. Russian language instruction in the elementary grades has been conducted and is still being conducted [not] only by non-specialists but by teachers who have a poor command of the Russian language." (*Translations on USSR Political and Sociological Affairs*, No. 689, JPRS 65986, October 22, 1975, p. 2, from "Unremitting Attention to Russian Language Study," *Narodnoe Obrazovanie*, No. 9, September 1975, pp. 6-10.)

¹The nature of these problems is indicated by the materials cited in Goldhamer, op. cit., pp. 188-189. Refugee reports are far more eloquent.

²These reports come from both Western observers and Soviet refugees. It should be noted in this connection that the recent Soviet shipboard mutiny in the Baltic is rumored to have been at least partially sparked by ethnic frictions. See John K. Cooley, "Mutinied Soviet Destroyer Dispatched on Long Voyage," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 29, 1976,

Many of these difficulties could be at least partially alleviated by the reinstitution of national military formations of the sort that were the norm until 1936 and were selectively rehabilitated during World War II.¹ Assuming that this was not accompanied by a politically provocative and militarily counterproductive injunction against "home-basing," such a measure could yield a number of other benefits. For one, it would chasten critics of the spurious character of the "sovereignty" of the Soviet Union's constituent republics, including several outspoken dissidents who have placed the absence of national military formations high on their list of grievances.² In addition, it could foster a closer identity between national pride and Soviet patriotism, two sentiments that the regime has long sought to reconcile and fuse and that in fact can not only coexist but be mutually reinforcing. Finally, the existence of national military formations could lead to more efficient and effective civil-military cooperation at the local level in the event of all-out mobilization, civil defense emergency, or resort to martial rule.

p. 6. It is worth noting the report of Soviet ethnographers that 9.3 percent of a 1970 sample of Tartar workers who did not know Russian resented being directed by persons "of another nationality" (overwhelmingly Russian), while only 2.8 percent of those who knew Russian expressed such resentment. See I. V. Ariutunian, *Sotsialnaia struktura sel'skogo naseleniia SSSR*, Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'," Moscow, 1971, p. 195, Table 2. Concern on these accounts may well have been one of the factors responsible for the inauguration in the late 1960s of a major Soviet research program in military sociology and the sociology of the armed forces. (See Ilya Zemtsov, *IKSI: The Moscow Institute of Applied Social Research* (in Russian), Soviet Institution Series, No. 6, The Soviet and East European Research Center, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, April 1976, pp. 26-29.)

¹For a brief but authoritative outline of the history of national military formations, see A. A. Grechko, *Vooruzhennye sily Sovetskogo gosudarstva*, 2nd ed., Voennoe izdatel'stvo, Moscow, 1975, pp. 133-157. See also M. I. Kulichenko, *Natsional'nye otnosheniia v SSSR*, Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'," Moscow, 1972, pp. 324-325.

²See, for example, the protest letter of 17 Soviet political prisoners first published in Sweden in August 1974 and translated from the Swedish in *USSR National Affairs--Political and Social Developments*, Vol. 3, August 16, 1974, p. R12.

In view of these considerable advantages of a return to "military federalism," it would not be surprising if the possibility of such a return has been deliberated in official circles. That it has in fact done so is at least indirectly suggested by the expanded treatment of the interrelationship between national policy and military policy that differentiates the otherwise only slightly modified first (1974) and second (1975) editions of the late Marshal Grechko's highly authoritative *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State*.¹ Furthermore, an extremely reliable and unusually well-informed refugee source has recently reported that in the early 1970s the Kazakh and Estonian party leaderships both submitted official requests that conscripts from their republics be assigned predominantly to local garrisons rather than intentionally dispersed and that the Kazakh request was duly granted.² Whatever discussions or experiments may be occurring, however, the regime is unlikely to sanction a return to full-fledged military federalism or to permit the "indigenization" of local bases and garrisons to become a general policy. Rather, the fact that the recently published draft constitution, to replace the so-called Stalin constitution of 1936, drops both of the latter's references (in Articles 14-g and 18-b) to republic-level military formations suggests that the regime is eager to stifle all hopes and expectations to the contrary.³ Like the late Marshal Grechko, official commentators will probably continue to dwell on "the difficulty of preparing training manuals in different national languages" and the importance of reinforcing internationalist sentiments.⁴ The

¹ Cf. Grechko, op. cit., pp. 133-157, and Grechko, *Vooruzhennyye sily Sovetskogo gosudarstva*, 1st ed., Voennoe izdatel'stvo, Moscow, 1974, pp. 125-143.

² In a personal communication to the author and to Murray Feshbach.

³ Article 14-g of the 1936 constitution grants the central government the right to establish "guiding principles" for "the organization of the military formation of the union republics." Article 18-b affirms that "each union republic has its own military formations." The draft of the new constitution makes no mention of republic formations and states that the central government is responsible for "the organization of defense and leadership of the armed forces." (*Izvestia*, June 4, 1977, p. 3.)

⁴ Grechko, op. cit., 2nd ed., p. 150.

underlying motive, though, will almost certainly be a fear that indigenous units might provide tacit or open military support for nationalist challenges to central authority.

That such fear can be a significant factor in official thinking is indicated, for example, by Khrushchev's conduct during the large anti-destalinization riot that broke out in Tblisi, Georgia, in March 1956. Although this riot was clearly beyond the control of the civil authorities, Khrushchev *cancelled* the marching orders that had been issued to a nearby military unit which happened (by a rare anomaly) to be predominantly Georgian and allowed the rioters to rampage for 12 additional hours while more typical, ethnically heterogeneous troops were dispatched from outlying bases.¹ Some years later, it is true, Khrushchev himself proposed creation of a territorial militia to compensate for the troop reductions that he was introducing, partially in response to mounting demographic pressures.² Moreover, there is no doubt these pressures (which stemmed from a sharp but temporary drop in the country's supply of teenagers) were mild compared with those that are now emerging.³ Before drawing any hasty inferences from these facts, however, it is worth recalling that Khrushchev's militia proposal was never implemented and that any future analogues, let alone cognate proposals affecting the regular army, will be critically evaluated in the light of recent ethnopolitical developments that make it clear (as it was not clear in 1960) that the Tblisi riot was not the last such event and that even greater disturbances may yet be in the offing.

¹See, for example, Paul K. Cook, "The Soviet Union in the Year 2000," unpublished seminar notes, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, December 19, 1974, p. 15. The Tblisi riot took place on March 9, 1956, and, according to an untitled and anonymous Georgian *samizdat* report in the present author's possession, resulted in the death of around 500 rioters, some of whom were machine-gunned by tank units.

²See N. S. Khrushchev, "Disarmament Is the Path Towards Strengthening Peace and Ensuring Friendship Among Peoples," report to a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*, January 15, 1960, pp. 1-5, translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 12, No. 2, February 10, 1960, pp. 3-16, 23.

³The scarcity of teenagers in the late 1950s and early 1960s was, of course, a consequence of sharply falling wartime birth rates.

V. POLITICAL CURRENTS

When Brezhnev alleged in 1972 that the past fifty years had witnessed the formation of a new "Soviet nation" or "Soviet people" (*sovetskii narod*) which was now sufficiently robust to survive any ethnopolitical crisis and would eventually encompass the entire population of the USSR, he may or may not have been engaged in wishful thinking.¹ At a minimum, he could point to indisputable and massive demonstrations of all-union loyalty during World War II and to a steady, albeit slow and by no means universal, postwar growth in bilingualism, ethnic intermarriage, and interregional mobility. However, when he went on to assure his audience that the Soviet Union had definitely solved its "historic nationality problem," i.e., the problem of national deviationism and centrifugal nationalism, he was clearly and knowingly overstating what was at best a dubious, if not a completely indefensible, case.² Indeed, the countervailing evidence is so well known that a detailed exposition seems gratuitous. A summary rundown will remind the reader that:

1. Many members of the country's major diaspora nationalities, including not only the Jews but the Volga Germans, the Greeks, and the Meskhetian Turks, have become so embittered at the continued denial of their communal rights that they have renounced their Soviet citizenship and demanded to be "repatriated" to their in fact quite foreign "homelands."³

¹L. I. Brezhnev, *O piatidesiatiletii SSSR*, Moscow, 1973, p. 19.

²Brezhnev, op. cit., p. 24.

³The Jewish exodus movement is too well known to require any further commentary. The Greek exodus, which has been reported in a variety of sources, has apparently not been seriously impeded by the regime, and has therefore not been accompanied by any overt protest. For the German exodus movement, see, inter alia, Robert C. Toth, "Germans in Russia," *The Los Angeles Times*, April 24, 1976, pp. 1 and 25; also, David K. Shipler, "Soviet Germans Rally in Red Square," *The New York*

2. Nearly all of the country's "European" and Caucasian nationalities and at least one Turkic nationality (the Crimean Tartars) have produced outspoken critics of official nationality policies and practices. These critics have managed not only to replenish their own ranks in the face of hundreds, if not thousands, of arrests, but also to establish dynamic and resilient dissident organizations, ranging from clandestine parties, through editorial boards for the preparation of regular *samizdat* or underground journals, to networks for the public circulation of programs, petitions, and letters of protest, including one 1972 petition (to U.N. Secretary General Waldheim) that was signed by over 17,000 Lithuanians.¹
3. A number of nationalistically inspired acts of violence have included a two-day riot in Kaunas, Lithuania, in 1972, and several recent protest bombings and reported assassination attempts in Georgia.²
4. There have been numerous organized protest demonstrations against centrally imposed curbs on national self-expression,

Times, March 9, 1977, p. A12. On the Meskhetian Turks, see S. Enders Wimbush and Ronald Wixman, "The Meskhetian Turks: A New Voice in Soviet Central Asia," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Vol. 17, Nos. 2-3, 1975, pp. 320-340, and Ann Sheehy, *The Crimean Tartars, Volga Germans, and Meskhetians*, Minority Rights Group, No. 6, London, 1973.

¹For a good survey of Soviet national dissidence and national protest up to 1972, see *Conflict Studies*, No. 30, December 1972, pp. 1-27. For the Ukraine, see Michael Browne (ed.), *Ferment in the Ukraine*, Macmillan, New York, 1971. For the trial of members of a separatist party in Armenia, see Christopher S. Wren, "Separatist Group Tried in Armenia," *The New York Times*, November 17, 1974, p. 9. For the Baltic States, see V. S. Vardys, "Modernization and Baltic Nationalism," *Problems of Communism*, September/October 1975, p. 47. On *samizdat* especially and dissident activity more generally, see Gayle Durham Hollander, "Political Communication and Dissent in the Soviet Union," in Rudolf L. Tokes (ed.), *Dissent in the USSR*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1976, pp. 233-275.

²See Theodore Shabad, "Lithuanian Trial of Eight Starts," *The New York Times*, September 26, 1972, p. 15; *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 2, No. 12, June 7, 1973, p. 3.

including several mass gatherings by Crimean Tartars and a 1965 street vigil in Erevan that was reportedly attended by 100,000 Armenians.¹

5. There has been an extremely rapid increase in the membership of republic and local ethnographic societies and so-called societies for the preservation of architectural and historical monuments that were established in the 1960s to provide outlets for environmentalist and conservationist concerns. There is no doubt that the mushroom growth of these societies and their exceptional popularity reflect a more than merely antiquarian or folkloristic interest in national history and culture. In fact, there is every reason to suspect--as some Soviet security officials clearly do--that many of their members are no less nationalistic than the members of the not-so-remotely analogous Matica Hrvatska and Matica Srbska organizations that provided key recruitment bases for the massive national protest movements that recently rocked Yugoslavia.²
6. There have been numerous recent cases in which native party and state officials, including two republic party first secretaries with seats on the Politburo (the Georgian, V. P. Mzhavandze, and the Ukrainian, P. Ye. Shelest), have shown a certain laxity in combating the forces of "local nationalism" and have pursued the

¹On the Crimean demonstrations in Tashkent and Chirchick, Uzbekistan, see Ann Sheehy, op. cit., p. 17. In 1966, the Tartars also presented the Kremlin a protest letter, demanding repatriation to their Crimean homeland, with over 130,000 signatures--i.e., the greater part of the adult Crimean Tartar population. (See Roy Medvedev, *On Socialist Democracy*, W. W. Norton, New York, 1975, p. 35, fn. 4.) On the Erevan demonstration, see Christopher S. Wren, op. cit., p. 9.

²For secret police concern about these societies, see *Soviet Analyst*, Vol 3, No. 19, September 19, 1974, pp. 1-2. More generally, see "Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments," *Soviet Union*, No. 10, 1972, and S. T. Palmer, "The Restoration of Ancient Monuments in the USSR," *Survey*, No. 74/75, Spring and Summer 1970, pp. 163-174. The first of these articles quotes a Soviet source (p. 4) that claims these societies have over 7,000,000 individual and 41,000 collective members.

"parochial" interests of their co-nationals at the expense of their all-union responsibilities.¹ These cases have been widely publicized in the Soviet press, and there is no reason to doubt that most of the officials concerned are at least partially "guilty" as charged and have in fact encouraged (or failed to discourage) the retention of local resources for local use, the curtailment of immigration by ethnic "aliens," the preferential treatment of native cadres, the publication of "nationally pretentious" books and articles, the "tendentious" designation of historical monuments, the perpetuation of "archaic" traditions and retrograde survivals of the past, and even the lenient treatment of dissident nationalist intellectuals.²

Although these manifestations of national self-affirmation and self-assertiveness are a far cry from the explosive international or center-periphery confrontations that took place in earlier periods of Soviet history (e.g., during the revolution and civil war, and the early wartime and postwar years) or that have recently occurred in a number of other multi-national policies (Yugoslavia, Canada, Belgium, the United Kingdom, etc.), they are more than sufficient to demonstrate that the USSR has neither transcended its own history nor become immune to worldwide trends.³ Unless the regime undergoes an improbable

¹In addition to the Ukraine and Georgia, Armenia has suffered through a particularly extensive "renewal" of leading cadres as a result of the regime's vigilance campaign against "local nationalism."

²For charges to these effects, see, among many others, the articles translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 25, No. 11, April 11, 1973, pp. 12-16, and Vol. 25, No. 16, 1973, pp. 5-10 and 36. Cf. also the article by Armenian party first secretary Kochinyan and the report by Georgian party first secretary Shevarnadze translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 24, No. 14, November 29, 1972, p. 15, and in *Translations on USSR Political and Sociological Affairs*, No. 386, JPRS 59134, May 25, 1973, pp. 25ff, especially pp. 29-30. Cf. also I. I. Groshev, *Bor'ba partii protiv natsionalizma*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1974, especially pp. 113-114.

³For a good treatment of nationality conflicts during the revolution and civil war, see Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954. For the war and immediate postwar periods, see John Armstrong, *The Politics of Totalitarianism*, Random House, New York, 1961, especially pp. 144-157.

restalinization or an even more improbable liberal-democratic transformation, such manifestations are likely to become more frequent and more insistent over time.¹ Although piecemeal reforms and partial crackdowns could undoubtedly have a tranquilizing effect, they would at best produce a temporary and deceptive calm, and there is a strong possibility that they would merely further agitate an already turbulent situation. Summarily stated, this seems to be the "lesson" of both the Khrushchev and the Brezhnev-Kosygin eras, and it is a lesson that is likely to retain its validity for the foreseeable future.²

One reason for anticipating an escalation in national self-affirmation and self-assertiveness is the accelerating "modernization" of the Central Asian nationalities, who have been conspicuously passive since their great uprising in the early 1920s, but who are almost certain to become more militant as, in one way or another, they are drawn into the mainstream of the country's economic development.³ At the same time, moreover, the "European" nationalities are likely to become increasingly restive as they are subjected either to an "onslaught" of Central Asian *gastarbeiter* or to an "expropriation" of "their" resources to speed the industrialization of distant Central Asia. In this connection, a particularly strong reaction can probably be expected from the Russians, among whom are numerous spokesmen who contend that the regime has sacrificed Russia's economic welfare and cultural integrity for the sake of an illegitimate "internationalism" and who will soon undergo the psychological distress of losing their majority status

¹Cf. Zbigniew Brzezinski (ed.), *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1969.

²Cf. Jeremy R. Azrael, "Communal Protests and Communal Rights in the USSR," paper delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1976.

³There were, however, reports of a riot in Tashkent in 1969, during which many demonstrators shouted "Russians out of Uzbekistan," *Chronicle of Current Events*, No. 8, June 30, 1969; *Soviet Uzbekistoni*, June 10, 1969. In addition, there was apparently some sort of nationality-related disturbance in the Narab region of Tadzhikistan in September 1970. See Barbara Wolfe Jancar, "Religious Dissent in the Soviet Union," in Tokes (ed.), op. cit., p. 219.

within the country's total population.¹ In the third place, increasing education and urbanization and improved communications will make it much harder for the regime to isolate the masses from dissident nationalist spokesmen or from the demonstration effects of nationalist protests within the Soviet Union or in the outside world. Finally, an increasing number of actual and potential nationalist protesters are likely to be outfitted with weapons and explosives, as a result of the diffusion of scientific and technical knowhow, the multiplication of laboratories and workshops (including those in homes) and the proliferation of local civil defense and pre-induction training arsenals.²

¹On the "revival" of Russian nationalism, see, inter alia, the following articles in a special issue of the *Slavic Review*, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 1973: Jack V. Haney, "The Revival of Interest in the Russian Past," pp. 1-16; Thomas E. Bird, "New Interest in Old Russian Things," pp. 17-28; and George L. Kline, "Religion, National Character, and the 'Rediscovery of Russian Roots,'" pp. 29-40. Also, see the Soviet collection, *Nash Sovremennik: Izbrannaiia proza zhurnala, 1964-74*, Sovremennik, Moscow, 1975, edited by Sergei Vikulov. For an officially published, though publicly criticized, pseudo-scientific genetic "theory" of Russian racial superiority, see the articles of L. N. Gumilev, cited in V. I. Kozlov, "On the Biological-Geographical Conception of Ethnic History," *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 12, December 1974, pp. 72-85, abstracted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 27, No. 20, June 11, 1975, pp. 1-5. According to Kozlov, Gumilev's ideas lead to the conclusion that virtually all of the non-Slavic peoples of the USSR are "illegitimate" and could not survive without the aid of the genetically better endowed Slavs, who, moreover, are able to preserve this superior endowment only by resisting intermarriage. (Kozlov, op. cit., p. 5.) On dissent manifestations of Russian integral nationalism and xenophobia, see Dmitri Pospelovskiy, "The Samizdat Journal *Veche*: Russian Patriotic Thought Today," *Radio Liberty Research Papers*, No. 45, 1971. For an interesting Ukrainian emigre criticism of the views of Russian dissidents on the nationality problem, see the editorial in *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No. 4, Winter 1975, pp. 350-357.

²For a very unusual Soviet article on the need for stricter gun control and on recently introduced legislation to implement such control, see Yu. Feofanov, "Reflections on a Well-Known Truth," *Izvestiia*, June 12, 1976, p. 5, translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 28, No. 24, July 14, 1976, p. 13. See also the even more interesting article by Col. General D. Molashvili, Chief of Staff of the Georgian Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs, entitled "Who Has Explosives?" *Zaria Vostoka*, April 1, 1976, p. 4, translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 28, No. 19, June 9, 1976, p. 13. This article, which was clearly inspired by the contemporaneous outbreak of terrorist bombings in Tblisi, calls for the creation of

Barring a breakdown of central control that might accompany a major war or the political degeneration that might accompany a prolonged and unfettered succession struggle, there is little likelihood that national protest will rise to unmanageable levels.¹ Under more normal circumstances, centrally manipulated sanctions and incentives will almost certainly suffice to prevent large communal uprisings or national insurgencies. This seems all the more certain because, as the examples of the United States during the Cold War and of China today suggest, even the most hostile foreign powers are unlikely to risk the retaliation that might follow efforts to provide would-be insurrectionaries with significant external support. The most which can be readily conceived, therefore, is "merely" more of the same--i.e., more numerous acts of individual and small group terrorism, more frequent episodes of collective violence, more massive protest demonstrations, and more extensive public or semi-public dissent. Even such manageable outcomes, however, would impose serious constraints on the regime.

At a minimum, the regime would be forced to increase its police budget and introduce security procedures that would not only be economically counterproductive but would demoralize and even disaffect citizens on whose loyalty and commitment it could otherwise rely. In the second place, the regime would find it increasingly difficult to persuade even strongly détente-oriented Western governments to sponsor or authorize the volume of technology transfers, grain sales, and development credits that could significantly brighten its somewhat gloomy economic prospects. Try as they might, such governments will be harder

"a single organization to conduct all work with explosives in the republic," since the control exercised by the 23 ministries which "do a significant amount of work with explosives" is often lax and "the evidence indicates that it isn't very difficult" to steal explosives from their stockpiles, storage facilities, work sites, etc.

¹As is well known, several prominent Soviet dissidents have predicted that the outbreak of a major war, especially a war with China, would lead to violent national uprisings and international pogroms. (See John P. Dunlop, "Solzhenitsyn in Exile," *Survey*, Vol. 21, No. 96, Summer 1975, p. 136; Peter Dornan, "Andrei Sakharov," in Tokes (ed.), op. cit., pp. 369-371; Andrei Amalrik, *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* Harper and Row, New York, 1970, pp. 62-64.

put to ignore Soviet violations of communal rights as the victims of these violations escalate their protests, especially if the latter come, as they almost certainly will, from groups such as the Jews, Germans, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians whose foreign conationals (in the United States, West Germany, Canada, Australia, etc.) constitute important domestic political constituencies. In the same vein, moreover, the regime could find it difficult to maintain or consolidate profitable political and economic relations with a range of non-Western countries whose native populations have strong ethnic affinities with restive nationalities in the USSR--a category of countries that includes Rumania (Moldavians), Iran (Tadzhiks and Azeri), Afghanistan (Azeri and Turkmen), and Turkey (Meskhetian Turks and the entire Soviet Turkic population), and that could by extension include all of the countries of the Muslim world. Finally--at least for present purposes--escalating national protest would further discredit the Soviet "model" of inter-national integration everywhere in the Third World and would undermine the regime's credibility as a spokesman for the oppressed nationalities in non-Communist countries.

VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST

Despite the ethnodemographic and ethnopolitical pressures that it faces, the Soviet regime will probably remain an imperialistic and potentially expansionistic dictatorship. As already indicated, these pressures are more likely to lead to increased domestic coercion and repression than to a liberal-democratic transformation of the regime. In addition, they are likely to strengthen the regime's determination to retain its Eastern European empire. If these pressures became sufficiently intense, the regime might be tempted to try to dissipate them by initiating political-military confrontations of a sort that could activate an otherwise recessive or inoperative "Soviet patriotism." Unless they happen to be "gratuitously" relieved by Western actions, however, these pressures also seem likely to offer some favorable opportunities for the containment and redirection of Soviet power.

For one thing, the Soviet Union could become more amenable to balanced reduction agreements of the sort that it has hitherto refused seriously to entertain. In addition, it might become more sensitive to the danger that its continued support of "national liberation movements" in other countries could lead to a retaliatory campaign on behalf of the oppressed nationalities of the USSR. At the moment the People's Republic of China is the only major power that is pursuing such a campaign in earnest, but the West's relative forbearance (as illustrated by U.S. actions to downplay "captive nations week," to semi-recognize Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States, to modulate the tone of official propaganda broadcasts, and to stress individual rather than communal rights in its diplomatic exertions) is an at least potentially reversible decision that the Soviet Union may be more than ordinarily eager to keep in force. Finally, the Soviet Union is likely to become substantially more dependent on Western economic cooperation and assistance, which will thereby acquire greater potential as negotiating instruments and sources of diplomatic leverage.

Whether these opportunities can be utilized to the West's advantage will depend importantly on the ability of the United States to act in

concert with its allies in a purposeful and timely fashion. Unfortunately, this capability is far easier to invoke than to attain, and by no means all currently observable signs are auspicious. Furthermore, policies designed to capitalize on these opportunities are likely to provoke strong normative, strategic, and tactical disagreements within the United States itself. Although some of these disagreements could probably be avoided by a more systematic assessment of past experiences and a more rigorous formulation of analytical guidelines, others seem certain to persist. How these disagreements will be resolved is intrinsically unpredictable, and this report is not the place for even a preliminary consideration of the potentially contentious issues. Given the historic and continuing competition between the Soviet Union and the West, however, it does not seem inappropriate to suggest that the promise of a less expansive Soviet "globalism" and a lower Soviet profile in international affairs should not be undervalued in principle or dismissed as chimerical before it has been prudently but seriously pursued.

APPENDIX

	National Population (thousands)		Annual Growth Rate ^a (%)	Straightline Projection of Population ^b (thousands)		"Eurocentric" Projection of Population ^c (thousands) (percent of total)	
	1959	1970		1985	2000	1985	2000
"European"							
Russian	114,114	129,015	1.12	153,427	180,305	51.2	47.9
Ukrainian	37,253	40,753	0.82	46,061	52,062	15.4	13.8
Belorussian	7,913	9,052	1.23	10,874	13,063	3.6	3.5
Moldavian	2,214	2,698	1.81	3,533	4,626	1.2	1.2
Lithuanian	2,326	2,665	1.24	3,208	3,862	1.1	1.0
Latvian	1,400	1,430	0.19	1,472	1,515	0.5	0.4
Estonian	939	1,007	0.63	1,118	1,219	0.4	0.3
Total "European"	166,159	186,620	1.06	219,693	256,652	73.2	68.1
"Non-European"							
Uzbek	6,015	9,159	3.90	16,250	28,832	5.4	7.7
Tatar	4,968	5,931	1.62	7,552	9,616	2.5	2.6
Kazakh	3,622	5,299	3.52	8,904	14,958	3.0	4.0
Azeri	2,940	4,380	3.69	7,543	12,991	2.5	3.5
Armenian	2,787	3,559	2.25	4,967	6,933	1.7	1.8
Georgian	2,692	3,245	1.71	4,187	5,401	1.4	1.4
Tadzhik	1,397	2,136	3.94	3,811	6,800	1.3	1.8
Turkmen	1,002	1,525	3.89	2,704	4,794	0.9	1.3
Kirgiz	969	1,452	3.75	2,520	4,375	0.8	1.2
Total "Non-European"	26,392	36,686	3.03	58,438	94,700	19.5	25.1
All Other	16,135	18,334	1.16	21,823	25,411	7.3	6.7
Total Population	208,686	241,640	1.34	299,954	376,763	100.0	100.0
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^a Annual growth rates were obtained by solving the following equation: $(1+r)^t = P_{70}/P_{59}$ for r , where $t=11$.

^b Straightline projections for 1985 and 2000 were obtained by using the formula $P_{70}(1+r)^t$, where $t=15$ for 1985, and $t=30$ for 2000.

^c "Eurocentric" projections for 2000 were obtained by using the formula $P_{85}(1+r)^t$, where P_{85} is the straightline projection of population in 1985, and altering the annual rates of growth (r) in the following manner:

In the case of the Russians, Ukrainians, Latvians, and Estonians, the annual growth rate was increased to 1.20 percent.

In the case of the Moldavians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians, the annual rate of growth for 1959-70 was continued.

In the case of the Armenians, Georgians, and Tatars, the annual rate of growth was decreased to 1.50 percent.

In the case of the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Azeri, Tadzhiks, Turkmen, and Kirgiz, the annual rate of growth was decreased sharply to 2.0 percent.

